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An Expert's Reputation
"Comment is free, but facts are sacred" is both a good working tale
for journalists and a fairly accurate encapsulation of their
obligations under the law of libel. The difficulty of course lies in
sorting out fact from comment. It was this difficulty that faced the
Nova Scotia courts in Barltrop v. Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation, 1 and the appeal judges came up with a different
answer from the trial judge.
The case was one of the legal reverberations of the controversy
about lead poisoning in Toronto during 1974. The C.B.C.'s
programme "As It Happens" broadcast a special feature on the
dispute, though lawyers for the two smelting companies obtained an
interim injunction that forced the producers to make substantial
deletions from the programme before it was broadcast in central and
western Canada. 2 The whole feature was heard in the Atlantic
Provinces, however, and listeners in Nova Scotia were therefore
able to hear doctors question the value of expert evidence about
dangers to health given at hearings such as those held in Ontario on
the threat of lead poisoning. After an extract from a press
conference in which the plaintiff, Dr. Barltrop, cautioned against
attributing high levels of lead in the blood to the activities of
particular smelting plants, there was a contribution from a doctor in
the United States who concluded that "it is possible to buy any
information you want, to substantiate any viewpoint." He added,
"Dr. Barltrop is a paid consultant to the lead industry. He is paid to
say what he has just said." Then he (and later another speaker)
reiterated the public's disillusion with expert testimony in the
United States.
In their context, the words were plainly defamatory of Dr.
Barltrop. The statement, that he was paid to say what he did, was in
one sense true: he was paid $1,000 a day by the smelting companies
whilst in Toronto to attend the hearings. But the innuendo was that
he was prepared to tailor his evidence to fit the expectations of
whoever was hiring him. It cast doubt on his integrity as a
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1. (1978), 25 N.S.R. (2d) 637
2. Canada Metal Co. v. C.B.C. (1974), 44 D.L.R. (3d) 329; aff'd 55 D.L.R. (3d)
42 (Div. Ct., Ont.)
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physician. Counsel for the C.B.C. must have taken this as the
meaning intended, for when Dr. Barltrop sued in Nova Scotia they
pleaded the defence of fair comment on a matter of public interest,
not justification.
Morrison J. decided that the defence succeeded. 3 The doctor
voluntarily contributed to the discussion on lead poisoning and, he
said, "having entered the ring" he had to "be prepared to accept
the blows given him." ' 4 However, the Appeal Division (Mac-
Keigan, C.J.N.S., Coffin and Cooper JJ.A) thought the words
implied as a fact that the doctor gave "false or misleading evidence
with unethical disregard for the health of the public," so the fair
comment defence was inapplicable. They awarded general damages
of $20,000.
This was apparently one of those cases in which reasonable
judges could, and did, differ. Morrison J. thought it was fair
comment; the appeal judges thought it was a statement of fact. To
many, this writer included, it would appear that the plain meaning
of the words (that Dr. Barltrop was paid in order that he might give
evidence), was a matter of fact which was true, but that the
innuendo meaning (that he was paid to give evidence favourable to
his paymaster) was a statement of fact with an element of comment
- the comment being on the credibility of expert evidence before
tribunals. So neither the trial judge nor the appeal court was totally
right or wrong in characterizing the words as, respectively,
comment and fact. This view would not, however, dispute the
outcome in the appeal division, for the defence of fair comment
founders if the facts on which the comment is based are false.
5
Therefore the C.B.C. would still have been faced with the
undischargeable burden of proving that the allegation was true.
Ironically, they would have had a more readily defensible position if
the language used had been more precisely libellous: if, instead of
ambiguously asserting that Dr. Barltrop "is paid to say what he has
just said," the contributor had elucidated what he found
objectionable in specific testimony given by the doctor and had then
added that he found such testimony unethical or dishonourable, the
line between fact and opinion would have been clear and the plea of
3. (1978), 25 N.S.R. (2d) 666
4. Id., at 685-686
5. London Artists v. Littler, [1969] 2 Q.B. 375; Lawson v. Burns, [1975] 1
W.W.R. 171 (B.C.S.C.)
394 The Dalhousie Law Journal
fair comment would have had a better chance of succeeding. 6 The
words actually broadcast look uncomfortably like a 'smear'.
Even so, it does seem unjust that a man who willingly enters a
public controversy should resort to the courts when others attack his
views. As Morrison J. put it in his trial judgment:
It is clear that the doctor accepted fees of his appearances to give
testimony when called by the metal companies, and, as a matter
of fact, did this on more than one occasion. What else then can be
expected but that someone might very well allege that he was
getting paid to say what he said?
7
Moreover, as he pointed out later, lawyers well know the dubious
value of expert evidence. Though the doctor's claim would be given
short shift in the United States, where the sentiment that he who
sticks his neck out must expect attempts to chop it off has found
favour with judges, 8 in Canada and England the truth of the libel
remains paramount.
There is however no rule against taking the plaintiff's
embroilment in a public issue into consideration when setting
damages. This the Appeal Division clearly did not do. $20,000 is a
high price for a reputation, even that of an eminent paediatrician. It
seems particularly excessive in the light of the doctor's willingness
to present his views on a topical question.
Damages for libel have not caused the uneasiness in Canada that
they have elsewhere, largely because there have been few of the
inflated awards that have been made by juries in England and the
United States. Barltrop and one or two other recent cases 9 may
signal the end of this parsimonious (or sensible) approach to the
value of reputation. How, then, did the appeal court reach its
generous figure in this case? After telling us, as most judges with
the task of setting a libel award have a habit of doing, that damages
for lost reputation are not susceptible to exact calculation,
6. Though the C.B.C. might have had difficulty with Campbell v. Sponiswoode
(1863), 32 L.J.Q.B. 185, where it was said that suggestion of dishonourable
conduct can never be defended as fair comment. This case was not considered at
the trial.
7. Supra, note 3, at 686
8. See New York Times v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254, and its progeny, the
latest of which are Gertz v. Robert Welch (1974), 418 U.S. 323 and Time v.
Firestone (1976), 424 U.S. 448
9. Chernesky v. Arridale Publishers (1978), 79 D.L.R. (3d) 180 (Sask. C.A.);
McCain Foods v. Agricultural Publishing Co., Chronicle-Herald, Halifax, N.S.,
April 26, 1978
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MacKeigan C.J.N.S. quotes without comment Professor Fleming's
view that
Reputation seems to be considered of much greater value than life
or limb, dishonour an infinitely greater injury than agonizing and
protracted physical suffering. '0
This of course was meant by Fleming as criticism - in fact he
makes the point bluntly in the phrase which precedes this, which the
Chief Justice did not see fit to quote: "the tolerated level of awards
is incongruously inflated in comparison with those in personal
injury actions."" Yet the Chief Justice seems to use the quotation
as justification for generosity, asserting that courts
have frequently allowed very large sumos as damages where
widely published defamation has seriously slurred a fine
reputation, even where no loss could actually have been suffered,
financially or otherwise. '
2
He then examines some of the highest libel awards ever, including
those in the Yousoupoff and Platt cases, 13 as if they provided an
indication of the generality of defamation damages. In fact they are
quite unrepresentative: successful libel plaintiffs, even those
defamed on radio programmes, have in recent years collected
between $5,000 and $10,000.14
But it was not just a comparison with previous cases that led the
court to $20,000. The absence of an apology, the failure of the
C.B.C.'s employees to act with the responsibility and objectivity
expected of professional journalists, the credibility of the
programme and the wide dissemination of the libel, all operated to
aggravate damages, though the court did not think that they called
for punitive damages.' 5 These are recognized considerations,
though the last should not have been given great weight, since most
of the words complained of were broadcast in only the Atlantic
region. The most potent factor, however, seems to have been the
eminence of the plaintiff. The court was most impressed with Dr.
Barltrop: half a page in the law report is devoted to a list of his
10. Fleming,Law of Torts (4th ed.), at 521; in the 5th edition this is at page 584
11. Id.
12. Supra, note 1, at 662
13. Respectively (1934), T.L.R. 581 (C.A.) and (1964), 44 D.L.R. (2d) 17 (Ont.)
14. E.g. Thomson v. N.L. Broadcasting (1976-77), 1 C.C.L.T. 278 (B.C.S.C.);
Fritz v. Jim Patterson Broadcasting, [1976] W.W.R. 180 (B.C.S.C.); Lawson v.
Burns, [1975] 1 W.W.R. 171 (B.C.S.C.)
15. Supra, note 1, at 664-665
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qualifications and achievements. '6 Although there was no evidence
that he had been demeaned in the eyes of fellow specialists, who
apparently do not listen to "As It Happens", the court was
concerned about the harm done to his "international reputation"
and the possibility that he would lose some work as a consultant.
But the injury seems to have been more to the doctor's pride than
to his professional standing or his ability to attract lucrative
consultancy contracts. Given the lack of demonstrable harm and the
plaintiff's assuming the risk of criticism by entering the lead
poisoning debate, a much smaller award would surely have
indicated his good name. Moreover there is something unpalatable
about the famous and the prominent enjoying higher damages
because of their very fare and prominence and there is something
offensive to one's sense of justice about $20,000 hanging on the
impressionistic matter of whether words are fact or comment.
Barltrop is surely one of those cases which should have no
reflection upon the appropriateness of damages as a remedy for
injury to reputation. A broadcast retraction would have been just as
effective in putting right any wrong that was in fact done to the
plaintiff; and giving him the right to respond to the innuendo of
professional dishonesty would have had the advantage of allowing
him to set the record straight irrespective of whether the words were
found to be fact or comment, though perhaps the C.B.C.'s staff
should have thought about that when they were putting the
programme together. 17
Even if we accept that the common law is right to give money as
recompense for intangible harm, there remains the question of the
relativity of libel and personal injury damages. When libel awards
are discussed, lawyers are apt to blame the jury for having a warped
idea of the value of a reputation. This is of course unfair, because
jurors have no notion of what is usually given for a libel or any other
wrong: that is precisely why they are chosen. Because there is no
scientific method of measuring the worth of reputation, the matter is
left to laymen, who are supposed to be in closer touch with
community values than is a judge. Appeal judges will interfere with
jury awards only in patently perverse cases, so juries take the blame
when damages get out of hand. Yet the C.B.C. could hardly have
16. Supra, note 1, at 642
17. For retraction and reply as remedies in defamation, see Fleming, (1978) 12
U.B.C.L.R. 15
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fared worse with a jury than it did with three appellate judges. 18
Neither is it altogether satisfactory to blame judges for the
disparity between defamation and personal injury awards. They can
do justice only in the case before them, not in relation to other
causes of action. But it is reasonable to expect some rough
proportionality between the injury and the compensation. The court
that gave Dr. Barltrop $20,000 recently approved an award of
$125,000 to a young workman who was grossly paralysed 19 and
around $50,000 seems to be the accepted rate for the loss of a leg in
Nova Scotia, as elsewhere in Canada. 20 No one would doubt that
such grave physical damage requires greater compensation than the
ephemeral pychological damage of a libel, though some may
quarrel with the relative generosity of the awards.
The appeal court's affirmation of the $10,000 given to a farmer
who was in hospital for two months and suffered permanent partial
disability as a result of a gunshot wound2 ' is more difficult to justify
in the light of Barltrop, and the same may be said of the $10,000
and $8,500 given for multiple injuries from which a good recovery
was made. 22 To do better than the doctor-expert one apparently has
to suffer a fractured jaw, smashed teeth and a shattered thigh,
resulting in permanent scars, one leg shorter than the other
(probably leading to back problems), several weeks on crutches and
an inability to work or enjoy sports as before the accident.
23
The fault lies more with inflated libel damages than low personal
injury awards. A few more cases like Barltrop will surely make
defamation a topic for reform in Canada, as it has been in England,
Australia and the United States. This may not be a bad thing; but it
is disappointing to see a Nova Scotia court adopting what Lord
Diplock once called "the scale of values of the duel."
2 4
18. The case was tried by judge alone because the C.B.C., a Crown Corporation,
is not entitled to a jury: Crown Liability Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.C-38, and Toronto
Star v. C.B.C. (1975), 11 O.R. (2d) 289 (S.C.)
19. Barkhouse v. Vanderploet (1976), 16 N.S.R. (2d) 445
20. See, e.g., Williams v. Grant (1975), 21 N.S.R. (2d) 530 and Veinot v. Veinot,
S.H. No. 13269, Nov. 10, 1977 (N.S.S.C., A.D.)
21. Curry v. Curry (1977), 21 N.S.R. (2d) 454
22. Maclssac v. Hickey (1975), 18 N.S.R. (2d) 29; Mercer v. MacGregor
23. Liffin v. Hamel (1976), 23 N.S.R. (2d) 89:$25,000
24. McCarey v. Associated Newspapers (No. 2), [1965] 2 Q.B. 86, 109
